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The security of measurement device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) relies
on a thorough characterization of one’s optical source output, especially any noise in the state
preparation process. Here, we provide an extension of the loss-tolerant protocol [Phys. Rev. A
90, 052314 (2014)], a leading proof technique for analyzing the security of QKD, to MDI QKD
protocols that employ mixed signal states. We first reframe the core of the proof technique, noting
its generalization to treat d-dimensional signal encodings. Concentrating on the qubit signal state
case, we find that the mixed states can be interpreted as providing Alice and Bob with a virtual
shield system they can employ to reduce Eve’s knowledge of the secret key. We then introduce a
simple semidefinite programming method for optimizing the virtual operations they can perform on
the shield system to yield a higher key rate, along with an example calculation of fundamentally
achievable key rates in the case of random polarization modulation error.
INTRODUCTION
There has been a lot of interest in the subject of quan-
tum hacking against practical QKD systems [1, 2]. In
particular, single photon detectors have turned out to
be the weakest link in the security of practical QKD.
To completely short circuit all possible attacks on single
photon detectors, the concept of measurement-device-
independent QKD has been introduced and widely de-
ployed. Measurement device-independent quantum key
distribution (MDI QKD) protocols allow two distant par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to distribute a shared, secret cryp-
tographic key, even in the presence of an eavesdropper,
Eve, who has complete control of their quantum chan-
nels and the measurement devices employed in the pro-
tocol [3] (see also Ref. [4]). Typically, Alice and Bob
prepare a set of signal states, send them to a central
measurement node potentially controlled by Eve, which
then makes an announcement based on a measurement it
may or may not have faithfully executed. The cost of the
information-theoretic security in such a setting is that
Alice and Bob need to trust and characterize the optical
sources they employ to send signals to the measurement
devices. Thus, a proper understanding of the source fea-
tures and flaws, and knowing how to account for them in
a security proof is especially valuable for quantifying the
key rates offered by an MDI protocol.
In this work, we answer a seemingly simple question:
how do you construct a security proof for an MDI QKD
protocol that employs trusted, yet noisy – i.e. mixed
– signal states? To clarify, protocols that employ the
decoy state method [5, 6] call for mixed optical states
in the form of phase-randomized weak coherent pulses.
However, in those protocols, the signal states – i.e. the
single photon contributions – from which the security of
the key is derived are still often assumed to be pure. In
this work, we specifically consider the issue of noisy signal
states for MDI QKD protocols. We emphasize that hav-
ing a consistent framework for optimally determining the
security of QKD protocols employing mixed signal states
from a trusted source is valuable since in any practical
implementation of a protocol, even if the protocol calls
for pure signal states, a realistic source will not be able
to initialize a state with perfect purity; thus, we desire a
security proof that can take into account the mixed na-
ture of the signal states in an optimal manner, given that
Eve may not hold the purification of the mixture.
There are several leading proof techniques for handling
state preparation errors in a QKD protocol. The first ma-
jor analysis was performed by Gottesman, Lo, Lutken-
haus and Preskill [7]; however, they assumed pessimisti-
cally that Eve could amplify such noise to her benefit,
and so the technique was not robust over long distances
against e.g. coherent modulation errors. An improved
technique was provided in the loss-tolerant protocol [8],
which uses basis mismatch statistics to infer phase error
rates that cannot be directly observed in the case state
preparation is non-ideal. However, the technique leaves
ambiguous how to treat mixed signal states, a gap this
work closes. A different extension of the loss tolerant
protocol was considered in [9]; however, their focus was
primarily on leaky sources, so their treatment of mixed
states was analogous to [8]. Another notable technique
for characterizing security given pure qubit signal states
is provided by [10]; however, their technique for general-
izing to mixed signal states uses a suboptimal approach
of calculating the key rates for each of the pure states
in the mixture, then averaging them, which will yield an
equal or lower key rate than the key rate produced from
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2the true average signal state. Lastly, an approach for
finding a numerical lower bound on the Devetak-Winter
secret key rate [11] for MDI-QKD protocols is provided
by [12, 13]; their technique is in principle extendable to
noisy state preparation. In our work, we take a con-
ceptually simpler strategy of directly optimizing the key
rate formula from [14], which uses the bit, x and y phase
errors of qubits in a virtual picture of the protocol.
In the case state preparation noise can be trusted and
characterized, but perhaps not reduced, we provide here
a simple analytical and numerical toolbox for calculating
an optimal secret key rate. First, we provide a re-framing
of the tilted four-state loss-tolerant protocol which pro-
vides a method for fixing Eve’s degrees of freedom in the
secret key rate [8, 15, 16]. However, as the signal states
are mixed, the security also depends on how we treat
the trusted noise in the signal state generation. Typi-
cally, the security of QKD is analyzed in terms of Alice
and Bob’s ability to virtually distill maximally entangled
EPR pairs, since measurement of such pairs yields per-
fectly correlated keys, and by the monogamy of entangle-
ment, the results cannot be correlated with anyone else,
including Eve. However, it is known that a larger class
of states known as private states [17–20] are fundamen-
tally what is required to produce secret key. Formally,
private states can be constructed from an EPR pair if
Alice and Bob take ancillary shield systems they control,
and apply a “twisting” unitary operation between the
EPR pair and the shields, the condition being that this
twisting leave unaffected the measurement results that
generate secret key. Since twisting does not change the
key, private states can then be understood as deflecting
some of Eve’s attack on the systems that generate key
to the shield systems. See Fig. 1 for a diagram of this
concept.
In our technique, we show that the mixing noise of
the signal states can be treated in a virtual picture as
being equivalent to Alice and Bob employing shield sys-
tems that can be used to decrease Eve’s knowledge of the
key. Completely within this virtual picture, we can ap-
ply unitary twisting operations to the shields to decrease
the phase errors of the protocol, increasing the secret key
rate. We provide simple semi-definite programs to find
the optimal twisting operations, yielding the optimal key
rate under this framework. Semi-definite programming
[21] has recently become a powerful tool for quantifying
the asymptotic security of QKD protocols [12, 13, 22–27].
While private states have been of significant conceptual
interest, as far as we are aware, this is the first application
of private states in a practical QKD setting. Finally, we
apply our technique to calculating fundamentally achiev-
able key rates in an MDI QKD protocol with randomized
modulation error in the state preparation procedure. We
note that our technique is applicable to a general class of
MDI QKD protocols in which Alice and Bob each employ
four qubit signal states; as we will see, so long as their
states do not fall in the same plane of the Bloch sphere
(which is easy to impose in practice), they can be sub-
ject to general asymmetric preparation noise. Moreover,
these signal states can be the single photon components
of phase randomized coherent states in a decoy state pro-
tocol.
CHARACTERIZING EVE’S STATE
We consider an MDI QKD protocol in which Alice and
Bob each prepare four mixed qubit signal states {ρi,xA }
and {σj,yB }, that they will send respectively with prob-
abilities pi,x and qj,y to the central measurement node
controlled by Eve. Here, i = 0, 1, j = 0, 1 index two sets
of states Alice and Bob each independently choose from.
When Alice and Bob choose i, j = (0, 0) these are the
key generation states. All other settings i, j correspond
to test states used to constrain the phase errors. When
i, j = (0, 0), (x, y) correspond to their key bit values,
while for other combinations of (i, j), (x, y) simply index
which test signal states are being sent. Following the se-
curity proof of the loss tolerant protocol [8], we require
that the sets of states {ρi,xA } and {σj,yB } each form a tetra-
hedron on the Bloch sphere, meaning the Bloch vectors
cannot all lie in the same plane [8]. In a decoy state pro-
tocol, these signal states correspond to the single photon
components of phase-randomized weak coherent pulses;
in the Supplementary Material, we provide steps for how
to use our technique within a decoy state protocol in the
asymptotic limit of an infinite number of decoys.
We now invoke that these are two-dimensional signal
states, so each can be fully characterized with two or-
thonormal basis vectors, which we can take without loss
of generality to be the polarization states |H〉 , |V 〉:
ρi,xA σ
j,y
B =
V∑
m,m′,
n,n′=H
ci,xm,m′d
j,y
n,n′ |m,n〉 〈m′, n′|A,B (1)
Under unitary evolution, each of these basis vectors
evolves to a (subnormalized) state in Eve’s possession as
well as a classical announcement, z, which we take to be
pass or fail: |m,n〉A,B →
∑F
z=P |ezm,n〉E |z〉Z . This pro-
cess generalizes simply to multiple announcement events,
such as which Bell state Eve claims to have detected.
The probabilities that Eve announces a round suc-
cessfully passed as a function of the signal states sent
pi,j,x,ydet = p(z = P |i, j, x, y), provide constraints on the
inner product of Eve’s vectors 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E :
pi,j,x,ydet = p
i,xqj,y
V∑
m,m′,
n,n′=H
ci,xm,m′d
j,y
n,n′ 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E (2)
pi,j,x,ydet are observable quantities in the protocol, and they
3can also be used to directly calculate some quantities re-
quired for the secret key rate formula, such as the de-
tection probability in the key basis, p0,0det =
∑
x,y p
0,0,x,y
det ,
and the bit error rate eZ = (p
0,0,0,1
det +p
0,0,1,0
det )/p
0,0
det, where
we have taken |Φ+〉 to be the target Bell state that Alice
and Bob wish to distill in a virtual picture we describe
in the next Section.
For qubit signal states there are sixteen combina-
tions of (m,n,m′, n′), which we flatten to one label
s = 1, ..., 16. Thus, we can define ~es = 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E ,
the vectorized form of the Gramian matrix of Eve’s states
associated with a passing announcement. Solving for
~e means we can then calculate any objective function
of 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E , including all the phase error rates in
the six-state protocol key rate formula [8, 14, 28, 29],
even though we are only using four states, since the four
states are chosen to provide complete characterization of
Eve’s strategy. Additionally, we see that with Alice and
Bob sending four states each, (i, j, x, y) also takes on six-
teen combinations, which we can label with t = 1, ..., 16.
Hence, we can define a vector containing all the success-
ful detection probabilities (~pdet)t = p
i,j,x,y
det , and a matrix
dependent on the initial states from Eq. 1 used in the
protocol γˆts = p
i,xqj,yci,xm,m′d
j,y
n,n′ .
We see that Eq. 2 can be written compactly as:
~pdet = γˆ~e =⇒ ~e = γˆ−1~pdet (3)
where we additionally see that as long as γˆ−1 exists, then
we can exactly solve for ~e. We note the basis ordering
of γˆ can be chosen so that its rows are the tensor prod-
uct of the vectorized forms of the probability-weighted
signal states vec(pi,xρi,xA )
T ⊗vec(qj,yσj,yB )T . Since invert-
ibility of γˆ is equivalent to its rows being linearly inde-
pendent, this provides a clear minimum requirement for
state preparation, namely that the vectorized forms of
the states which Alice and Bob use in the protocol must
be linearly independent. In the Supplementary Mate-
rial, we show that meeting this condition is equivalent to
sending four states that form a tetrahedron on the Bloch
sphere, as found in the original security proof of the tilted
four-state loss tolerant protocol [8].
Remark: Having reframed the security proof from the
loss-tolerant protocol in this form, we observe that the
process from Eq. 3 can also generalize straightforwardly
to MDI QKD protocols employing discrete-variable high-
dimensional degrees of freedom, such as those employ-
ing orbital angular momentum [30–32] or timebin en-
codings [25, 33]. For Alice and Bob each sending d-
dimensional systems, the Gramian matrix 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E
of Eve’s states contains in general d4 elements. Thus,
Alice and Bob can each prepare d2 states within the d-
dimensional space, that will in turn yield d4 observable
detection probabilities. They can prepare their states
subject to vec(pi,xρi,xA ) ⊗ vec(qj,yσj,yB ) being linearly in-
dependent, where (i, j, x, y) has d4 possibilities. This con-
().,0 +,.,1EZ(a)
A’ B’A BE
Z(b) B'Ā
U A3B3 U4A BE
Z(c) B'Ā
FIG. 1. (a) A real MDI QKD protocol: Alice and Bob each
prepare mixed states associated with bit (x, y) and basis (i, j)
values. They send their states to a central node controlled by
Eve, who makes an announcement Z. (b) A virtual version of
the key generation states in the protocol: in a purified pic-
ture, Alice and Bob’s mixed signal states are entangled with
virtual qubits A¯B¯ which coherently store the bit values (x, y).
Measurement of A¯B¯ in the computational basis yields the raw
keys. The AB systems are additionally purified by the A′B′
systems to account for trusted noise in the source. Only the
A,B systems are sent to Eve. (c) An alternative virtual pu-
rification: all purifications are related by unitary operations
applied to, in general, a joint purifying ancilla, yielding pri-
vate states in A¯B¯A′B′. These “twisting” operations can opti-
mally boost the secret key rate as they can modify the phase
error rates which Alice and Bob need to estimate. In (a)–
(c), the signal states sent and the observed protocol statistics
(detection and bit error rates) are the same.
dition of linear independence for the vectorized density
matrices is a much less stringent condition to satisfy for
high-dimensional protocols than e.g. employing eigen-
states of a sufficient number of mutually unbiased bases
[34, 35], while still allowing for complete characterization
of the parameters in the high-dimensional secret key rate
formula that are dependent on Eve’s system [36].
OPTIMAL CHOICE OF VIRTUAL PROTOCOL
Having characterized Eve’s Gramian matrix entirely
from observable parameters in the protocol, we now move
to a virtual picture for the key generation signal states
to calculate the remaining parameters of the secret key
rate. In this virtual picture, which is depicted in Fig. 1,
the states of systems A,B from Eq. 1 are entangled with
virtual qubits A¯, B¯ that Alice and Bob keep in their lab
[8]. Importantly, since these signal states are mixed, we
require additional purifying ancillary systems A′B′. We
assume that the sources of noise are confined to Alice
4and Bob’s labs, meaning we can trust Eve does not have
access to manipulate A′B′. The mixedness of the signal
states then results in an effective virtual shield Alice and
Bob can use to minimize Eve’s knowledge of the secret
key.
The key generation states, p0,xq0,yρ0,xA σ
0,y
B can be con-
sidered virtually as a state of the form:
|ζ〉 =
∑
x,y
|x, y〉A¯B¯
V∑
m,n=H
|γx,ym,n〉A′B′ |m,n〉AB (4)
where we have constraints from the states in Eq. 1:
〈γx,ym′,n′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ = p
0,xq0,yc0,xm,m′d
0,y
n,n′ = γˆts (5)
since to generate key, Alice and Bob measure A¯B¯ in the
computational basis. The crucial point is that this pu-
rification is not unique [37], and so we have freedom to
choose the virtual picture that yields the optimal key
rate. Since Eve does not have access to A′B′, any purifi-
cation will yield a suitable lower bound on the key rate,
but we will show how to choose the optimal purification
with simple semidefinite programs.
We can parametrize all purifications using twisting uni-
tary operations [17–20] applied to the virtual ancillary
systems in |ζ〉:
UA¯B¯A′B′ =
1∑
x,y=0
|x, y〉〈x, y|A¯B¯ ⊗ Ux,yA′B′ (6)
Such an operation is entirely virtual, so it can be nonlo-
cal in general and never needs to be executed in the real
protocol. Twisting does not affect any of the real ob-
served detection probabilities, which correspond to Alice
and Bob first projecting A¯B¯ in the computational basis,
as we show in the Supplementary Material. Moreover,
since only the A,B portion of |ζ〉 evolves unitarily to
E,Z, the twisting operation need not be fixed from the
beginning of the protocol, and its choice can and should
be informed by the statistics of the protocol. We next
show exactly how these twisting operations affect the se-
cret key formula.
To quantify the security of the protocol, we employ
the key rate formula from the six-state protocol [14, 28,
29], noting, however, that our protocol employs only four
states:
R = p0,0det
(
1− h2(eZ)− eZh2
[
1 + (eX − eY )/eZ
2
]
− (1− eZ)h2
[
1− (eX + eY + eZ)/2
1− eZ
]) (7)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function, and eX and
eY are the phase error rates of the virtual qubits A¯B¯ in
the X and Y Pauli bases. These can be understood as
the probability of the virtual qubits being projected into
the incorrect Bell states given a passing announcement
from Eve:
eX =
〈Γ| [ (|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|)A¯B¯ ⊗ |P 〉〈P |Z ] |Γ〉
〈Γ|(|P 〉〈P |Z)|Γ〉
eY =
〈Γ| [ (|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|)A¯B¯ ⊗ |P 〉〈P |Z ] |Γ〉
〈Γ|(|P 〉〈P |Z)|Γ〉
(8)
Here, |Γ〉 denotes the joint state between A¯B¯A′B′EZ
after the AB portion of twisted purified state UA¯B¯A′B′ |ζ〉
is sent to Eve. Note as well 〈Γ|(|P 〉〈P |Z)|Γ〉 = p0,0det. The
six-state protocol key rate provides generally higher key
rates than the Shor-Preskill key rate [38] because it takes
into account correlations between the bit and phase error
patterns.
Employing Eq. 4, the form of the twisting opera-
tion in Eq. 6, and the unitary evolution |m,n〉A,B →∑F
z=P |ezm,n〉E |z〉Z , we find that eX and eY are linear
functions with respect to the elements of Eve’s Gramian
matrix 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E , which are already known from Eq.
3. Additionally, the phase errors are linear with respect
to matrix elements 〈γx′,y′m′,n′ |Ux
′,y′ †
A′B′ U
x,y
A′B′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ , which
are functions of the twisting operation we control. We see
these elements form the Gramian matrix of the twisted
ancillary system states. Since our task is to modify the
twisting operation to boost the key rate, these elements
form the optimization variables of our problem. Their
only constraint is provided by Eq. 5, since by construc-
tion when x = x′, y = y′, the twisting operations cancel
to not affect the form of the real protocol signal states.
Of course, the binary entropy function in the key
rate formula from Eq. 7 breaks the linearity of the
key rate optimization with respect to eX and eY ; how-
ever, the linear combinations e± = eX ± eY can in-
stead be chosen as the objective functions of the op-
timization, since they are still linear with respect to
〈γx′,y′m′,n′ |Ux
′,y′ †
A′B′ U
x,y
A′B′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ . Moreover, we find that
e+ only depends on U+ = U
0,0 †
A′B′U
1,1
A′B′ and e−(U) only
depends on U− = U
0,1 †
A′B′U
1,0
A′B′ . Intuitively, we have such
a dependence since e− involves the Bell states that un-
derwent a bit flip, so Alice and Bob’s bit values will be
(0,1) and (1,0), and only those twisting unitaries will be
used. Similarly e+ reflects Bell states that did not un-
dergo a bit flip, so twisting will only involve (0,0) and
(1,1). Since the unitaries {U0,1A′B′ , U1,0A′B′ , U0,0A′B′ , U1,1A′B′}
can be defined independently of each other, the optimiza-
tion of e+ can be decoupled from the optimization of e−,
so we can overcome the nonlinearity introduced by the
binary entropy function in Eq. 7 by taking advantage of
the monotonicity of h2(·) and optimizing the arguments
e± of the function instead.
Taking stock, we have two independent objective func-
tions e±, which are linear with respect to our opti-
5mization variables 〈γx′,y′m′,n′ |Ux
′,y′ †
A′B′ U
x,y
A′B′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ . These
variables form a Gramian matrix, which is a positive
semidefinite matrix by construction, and they are addi-
tionally subject to linear constraints from Eq. 5. Thus,
these optimization problems take the form of semidefi-
nite programs which can be solved numerically on a stan-
dard laptop in a few seconds using available packages for
Python [39, 40] or Matlab [41]. While previous literature
on twisting operations had noted the opportunity for op-
timizing U [20], no explicit procedure was constructed.
Here, we have closed this gap, increasing the practicality
of utilizing a virtual twisting operation as a step in the
security proof. In the Supplementary Material, we pro-
vide complete details for framing the problem in terms
of semidefinite programs, along with the expressions for
the objective functions e± and their dependence on the
Gramian matrix of the A′B′ system.
KEY RATE RESULTS
We emphasize again that the only requirement for ap-
plying our technique is that Alice and Bob’s initial qubit
signal states cannot fall in the same plane of the Bloch
sphere, which is easy to satisfy in practice. Otherwise,
our technique can handle quite general noisy state prepa-
ration: Alice and Bob need not prepare the same sets of
states; they can send states with different probabilities;
and, the noise channel applied to each state can be de-
pendent on the state.
As a study of fundamentally achievable key rates, we
consider the following two-parameter (δ, p)-model for the
initial states. We suppose Alice and Bob attempt to pre-
pare the states {|H〉 , |V 〉 , |H〉+|V 〉/√2, |H〉−i|V 〉/√2}; how-
ever, each state is subject to a modulation error which
we treat as a random variable. The error and its distri-
bution can differ depending on the state. Given a dis-
tribution for the modulation error on the surface of the
Bloch sphere, the resulting average states can be treated
as having a constant coherent modulation error, i.e. a
constant offset angle from the ideal state, parametrized
by δ, as well as a depolarization noise parametrized by
p, which shortens the Bloch vector and introduces inco-
herent mixing to the states. For exact definitions of the
signal states, see the Supplementary Material. For the
case p = 0, we do not expect any improvement in our
key rate over the standard loss tolerant protocol, since
there would be no mixing and thus no virtual ancillary
system on which to apply a twisting operation.
In Fig. 2, we plot the asymptotic key rate found using
our technique as a function of distance for various pairs
(δ, p). We assume a Bell state detection scheme similar
to [3], with overall detection efficiency of 50%, a dark
count probability of 10−5 per pulse per detector, loss in
fiber of 0.2 dB/km, and error correction efficiency of 1.
For comparison with the key rate produced with our op-
FIG. 2. Top: Key rate vs. Alice-Charlie distance for vari-
ous values of modulation error and depolarizing noise (δ, p)
(same color indicates same model parameters). The dotted
lines are the results from a naive, suboptimal purification,
while the solid line indicates our optimized key rate over all
virtual twisting operations. Bottom: For each pair (δ, p), the
percentage increase offered by optimizing over twisting opera-
tions. We see our technique is best suited to states with more
preparation noise sent over longer distances. We assume a
single photon source and symmetric distances from Alice and
Bob to Charlie.
timization, we plot the key rate calculated using a sub-
optimal purification, which was constructed by simply
diagonalizing Alice and Bob’s signal states and having
the ancillary systems index the eigenvalues in decreasing
order.
We find that our technique provides a modest increase
over the “naive” purification one could have chosen, our
technique’s advantages being most significant as the de-
polarizing noise gets stronger (making the initial states
6more mixed), and at longer distances when the untrusted
channel noises (loss and dark counts) accrue. Addition-
ally, we see a better key rate can be produced by reducing
state preparation noise; however, once one has improved
as best possible, our technique provides an optimized key
rate given that level of noise. That is, our technique pro-
vides confidence that one has optimized over all possi-
ble ancillary states of the purification that are consistent
with the protocol statistics without worry that one has
chosen a pessimistic virtual picture.
CONCLUSION
We have presented an extension of the proof technique
from [8] to quantify the security of MDI QKD protocols
that employ general noisy qubit signal states. We first
reframed the analytical technique used for characteriz-
ing the parameters in the secret key rate that depend on
Eve’s system, noting that this new approach lends itself
clearly to a generalization for higher-dimensional signal
states. Next, we observed that employing trusted but
mixed signal states means Alice and Bob have not a sin-
gle but a set of virtual pictures they can use to analyze
security in their protocol; we observed this was equivalent
to Alice and Bob employing a virtual shield system onto
which they can apply virtual twisting operations to mini-
mize Eve’s knowledge of the key [17, 18]. Finally, we pro-
vided a simple numerical technique leveraging semidefi-
nite programming to optimize over all twisting operations
to optimize the six-state protocol secret key rate formula,
examining the implications for state preparation subject
to random modulation error.
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I. EMBEDDING OUR TECHNIQUE WITHIN A DECOY STATE PROTOCOL
In the main text, we showed that, using two independent semidefinite programs (SDP), we can optimize the secret
key rate of a loss-tolerant protocol where the signal states are two-dimensional mixed states. In the context of quantum
key distribution, those states are normally encoded in the mode (such as polarization or time-bin) of single photons.
However, in practice, many protocols employ weak coherent pulses with decoy states [1, 2]. In this section, we outline
how we can embed our technique in a loss-tolerant protocol which uses decoy states. In this work, we will consider a
protocol with infinite number of decoy states as in [3]. We leave the case where a finite number of decoy states are
used for future work. Like in the main text, we work in the asymptotic limit where we can ignore finite key effects.
Recall from the main text that to use our technique, we need two pieces of information: before sending optical
signals to Eve, we need the density matrices of the qubit signal states (the single photon component), and then once
the optical signals are sent, we need the probability of successful Bell state measurement given the states that Alice
and Bob chose. As such, to apply our technique when phase-randomised weak coherent pulses are used together
with a decoy state protocol, we need to calculate the state of the single photon component of the optical signal as
well as the probability of successful Bell state measurement given that Alice and Bob send the corresponding single
photon signals. In the literature, that conditional probability is often referred to as the single photon yield, denoted
by Y i,j,x,y11 .
To obtain the single photon component of the signals, we can simply project the coherent signal states to their
single photon components. Suppose that Alice and Bob prepare the phase-randomised coherent state ρ˜i,x,µAA and
σ˜j,y,µBB with intensity µA and µB respectively, the single photon components of those states can be easily obtained
by performing the following projection and then normalizing the resulting states
ρi,xA =
(
|0〉 〈0|HA ⊗ |1〉 〈1|VA + |1〉 〈1|HA ⊗ |0〉 〈0|VA
)
ρ˜i,x,µAA
(
|0〉 〈0|HA ⊗ |1〉 〈1|VA + |1〉 〈1|HA ⊗ |0〉 〈0|VA
)
e−µAµA
σj,yB =
(
|0〉 〈0|HB ⊗ |1〉 〈1|VB + |1〉 〈1|HB ⊗ |0〉 〈0|VB
)
σ˜j,y,µBB
(
|0〉 〈0|HB ⊗ |1〉 〈1|VB + |1〉 〈1|HB ⊗ |0〉 〈0|VB
)
e−µBµB
(S1)
where |0〉m and |1〉m are the vacuum and single photon states in mode m respectively.
Hence, it is important that we characterize the sources of each legitimate party before performing the protocol.
Ideally, this should be done by performing tomography on the signal states ρ˜i,x,µAA and σ˜
j,y,µB
B . Alternatively, one can
have a model for the source, taking into account the finite precision and randomness in the modulation of the signal
states. Once we have the single photon component of the signal states (i.e. ρi,xA and σ
j,y
B in Eq. (1) of the main text),
we can use them to construct the γˆ matrix in Eq. (3) of the main text, and to impose the constraints on the ancillary
systems A′B′ as described in Eq. (5) of the main text .
On the other hand, from the parameter estimation step of the protocol, we can estimate the gain Qi,j,x,yµA,µB for each
choice of states (i, x) and (j, y) and intensities µA, µB . When using infinite number of decoy states, Alice and Bob
can determine the values of the single photon yield Y i,j,x,y11 exactly for all i, j, x, y. Once the values of Y
i,j,x,y
11 are
obtained, we can replace the pi,j,x,ydet with Y
i,j,x,y
11 in Eq. (3) of the main text and then proceed with our method.
∗ bourassa@physics.utoronto.ca
† charles.lim@nus.edu.sg
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2FIG. 1. A tetrahedron in the Bloch sphere representing qubits encoded in horizontal, vertical, diagonal and clockwise circularly
polarized single photons. A tetrahedron is formed so long as the states don’t all fall in the same plane.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INVERTIBILITY OF γˆ AND THE STATES IN THE BLOCH
SPHERE FORMING A TETRAHEDRON
In the main text, we demonstrated that we could solve for the elements of Eve’s Gramian matrix using the equation:
~pdet = γˆ~e =⇒ ~e = γˆ−1~pdet (S2)
where ~es = 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E are the elements of the vectorized form of the Gramian matrix of Eve’s states associated
with a passing announcement. (~pdet)t = p
i,j,x,y
det form a vector containing all the successful detection probabilities, and
γˆts = p
i,xqj,yci,xm,m′d
j,y
n,n′ form a matrix dependent on the initial states used in the protocol which were taken to be:
ρi,xA σ
j,y
B =
V∑
m,m′,
n,n′=H
ci,xm,m′d
j,y
n,n′ |m,n〉 〈m′, n′|A,B (S3)
Here we show that the invertibility of γˆ is equivalent to the condition in the loss tolerant protocol [3] that Alice
and Bob each need to choose four signal states that form a tetrahedron in the Bloch sphere, as shown in Fig. 1.
We begin by noting that:
γˆts = p
i,xqj,yci,xm,m′d
j,y
n,n′ = p
i,xqj,y 〈m,n|ρi,xA σj,yB |m′, n′〉A,B (S4)
meaning we can always choose the basis ordering of γˆ so that its rows are vec(pi,xρi,xA )
T ⊗ vec(qj,yσj,yB )T , the tensor
product of the vectorized forms of the probability-weighted signal states. Invertibility of γˆ is equivalent to showing
its rows are linearly independent. Since all the row vectors have tensor product form, we just need to show that the
{vec(pi,xρi,xA )} and the {vec(qj,yσj,yB )} each form sets of linearly independent vectors.
Next, we recall that four states forming a tetrahedron in the Bloch sphere is equivalent to them having linearly
independent Stokes vectors. Let’s focus on Alice’s states, since the states are qubits, they can be expressed in terms
of Stokes parameters:
pi,xρi,xA =
1
2
3∑
r=0
P i,xr σr (S5)
where σ0 is the identity and σr, r = 1, 2, 3 are the Pauli matrices, while P
i,x
r = p
i,xTr(σrρ
i,x
A ) form the elements of
the Stokes vector ~P i,x for that state. Thus:
vec(pi,xρi,xA ) =
1
2
3∑
r=0
P i,xr vec(σr) (S6)
3It is easy to show that vec(σr)
Tvec(σr′) = δrr′ , which means the inner product of any two vec(p
i,xρi,xA ) is related
to the inner product of the Stokes vectors by a constant factor:
vecT (pi,xρi,xA )vec(p
i′,x′ρx
′i′
A ) =
1
2
3∑
r=0
P i,xr P
x′,i′
r
=
1
2
~P i,x · ~P x′,i′
(S7)
Thus, since the inner product structure of the rows of γˆ is identical to that of the Stokes vectors up to a factor, the
linear independence of the Stokes vectors is equivalent to the invertibility of γˆ.
III. THE VIRTUAL PICTURE AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE KEY RATE WITH SEMIDEFINITE
PROGRAMMING
In the main text, we provided an overview of how to determine the optimal virtual picture for our protocol using
a virtual twisting operation [4] and semidefinite programming. Here we provide the full mathematical details of our
analytical and numerical techniques.
A. Moving to a virtual picture
Given states of the form in Eq. S3, we can define a virtual purified picture for the key generation states:
{p0,xρ0,xA q0,yσ0,yB } → |ζ〉A¯B¯A′B′AB =
∑
x,y
|x, y〉A¯B¯
V∑
m,n=H
|γx,ym,n〉A′B′ |m,n〉AB (S8)
where TrA¯B¯A′B′(|x, y〉 〈x, y|A¯B¯ |ζ〉 〈ζ|A¯B¯A′B′AB) = p0,xρ0,xA q0,yσ0,yB fixes the constraint:
〈γx,ym′,n′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ ≡ p
0,xq0,yc0,xm,m′d
0,y
n,n′ = γˆts (S9)
where γˆts is the same matrix element as Eq. S4.
The constraint in Eq. S9 on the ancillary systems is not sufficient to identically fix the purification. Rather, any
unitary twisting operation of the form:
UA¯B¯A′B′ =
1∑
x,y=0
|x, y〉〈x, y|A¯B¯ ⊗ Ux,yA′B′ (S10)
preserves the real signal states, since:
TrA¯B¯A′B′(|x, y〉 〈x, y|A¯B¯ UA¯B¯A′B′ |ζ〉 〈ζ|A¯B¯A′B′AB U†A¯B¯A′B′)
=TrA¯B¯A′B′(|x, y〉 〈x, y|A¯B¯ Ux,yA′B′ |ζ〉 〈ζ|A¯B¯A′B′AB Ux,y †A′B′)
=p0,xρ0,xA q
0,yσ0,yB
(S11)
Since the produced signal states are independent of this twisting operation, it cannot affect any of the real detection
probabilities observed in the execution of the protocol which depend only on the A,B systems. Thus, the character-
ization of Eve’s Gramian matrix elements 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E is independent of the twisting operation. Moreover, since
the produced signal states are independent of the twisting operation it never needs to actually be implemented in the
real protocol, and can remain a useful virtual analytical tool in the characterization of security after the real signal
exchange. Finally, the twisting operation can be chosen after the detection statistics are produced, which gives Alice
and Bob the power to adjust their virtual strategy based on what they observe.
The major change when adding the twisting operation is the definition of the phase error rates, i.e. how we use
the information about Eve’s state from ~es. Consider the joint state between Alice, Bob, their ancillae, and Eve in the
purified picture after they apply a twisting operation and send the systems A,B to Eve:
UA¯B¯A′B′ |ζ〉A¯B¯A′B′AB → |Γ(U)〉A¯B¯A′B′EZ =
∑
x,y
|x, y〉A¯B¯
V∑
m,n=H
Ux,yA′B′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′
F∑
z=P
|ezm,n〉E |z〉Z (S12)
4Thus, taking the target virtual Bell state to be |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|A¯B¯ , the phase error rates now become the twisted phase
error rates:
eX(U) =
1
p0,0det
〈Γ(U)| [ (|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|)A¯B¯ ⊗ |P 〉〈P |Z ] |Γ(U)〉A¯B¯A′B′EZ
=
1
2
− 1
p0,0det
∑
m,n,m′,n′
Re
[( 〈γ0,0m′,n′ |U0,0A′B′†U1,1A′B′ |γ1,1m,n〉A′B′ + 〈γ0,1m′,n′ |U0,1A′B′†U1,0A′B′ |γ1,0m,n〉A′B′ ) 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E ]
eY (U) =
1
p0,0det
〈Γ(U)| [ (|Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|)A¯B¯ ⊗ |P 〉〈P |Z ] |Γ(U)〉A¯B¯A′B′EZ
=
1
2
− 1
p0,0det
∑
m,n,m′,n′
Re
[( 〈γ0,0m′,n′ |U0,0A′B′†U1,1A′B′ |γ1,1m,n〉A′B′ − 〈γ0,1m′,n′ |U0,1A′B′†U1,0A′B′ |γ1,0m,n〉A′B′ ) 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E ]
(S13)
In general, there exists an optimal purification provided by some UA¯B¯A′B′ such that the key rate is maximized. As
it is unlikely to choose this optimal purification at random when constructing the problem, we expect the calculation
of eX(U) and eY (U) to benefit from an optimization over UA¯B¯A′B′ , and thus, in general, for the key rate to increase
by employing an optimal twisted phase error rate.
Remark: employing noisy, i.e. mixed, signal states in the protocol begs the question of how best to purify the
states in the virtual protocol when defining the phase error rate. This necessarily leads to the definition of a twisted
phase error rate and a search for an optimal twisting operation with respect to the key rate. The twisting operation
is entirely in the virtual picture, so the optimal UA¯B¯A′B′ can and should be computed after the exchange of signals
and observation of detection probabilities and bit error rates. Although the form of the optimal twisting operation
can even be nonlocal across A¯B¯ in practice, it does not need to be implemented in the real protocol, so its locality
does not matter.
It is worth emphasizing that employing a twisting operation is an optional step in the security proof. Indeed, any
phase error rates of the form Eq. (S13) will supply a suitable lower bound on the key rate, since Eve does not have
control over the A′B′ systems. Nonetheless, optimizing over the twisting operation will in general boost the key rate,
safeguarding against a poor, overly pessimistic initial choice of purification.
We next demonstrate how optimizing the phase error rates over twisting operations can be framed as two semidefinite
programs, closing a gap in the previous literature on twisting operations [5].
B. Semidefinite programs for evaluating the six state key rate
A general optimization problem is of the form [6]:
minimize f0(x)
s.t. fi(x) ≥ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) are the variables over which we optimize; f0 : Rn → R is the objective function; fi : Rn → R
are the constraint functions; and, bi are the constraint bounds. An optimal solution, x
? would mean that for all z
such that fi(z) ≥ bi then f0(z) ≥ f0(x?).
Semidefinite programs (SDPs) are a class of convex optimization problems with linear objective and constraint
functions over a cone of positive semidefinite (PSD) matrices [6]. That is, the optimization variables, x, form the
elements of a matrix with non-negative eigenvalues, and fi(x) = ci ·x. They have become an incredibly versatile tool
for QKD security proofs in recent years [7–12].
1. Objective functions
At first glance, the optimization problem required for the six-state key rate in Eq. 7 of the main text looks daunting.
It appears we have two quantities to optimize with the twisting operation, eX(U) and eY (U), appearing in a nonlinear
function due to the binary entropy. However, consider a simple change of variable so that the two unknowns are given
by:
e−(U) = (eX − eY )(U), e+(U) = (eX + eY )(U) (S14)
5These remain linear objective functions of the only free variables in the problem
{ 〈γx′,y′m′,n′ |Ux′,y′A′B′†Ux,yA′B′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ }:
e+(U) = 1− 2
p0,0det
∑
m,n,m′,n′
Re
(
〈γ0,0m′,n′ |U0,0A′B′
†
U1,1A′B′ |γ1,1m,n〉A′B′ 〈e
P
m′,n′ |ePm,n〉E
)
= e+(U
0,0 †
A′B′U
1,1
A′B′)
(S15)
and:
e−(U) = − 2
p0,0det
∑
m,n,m′,n′
Re
(
〈γ0,1m′,n′ |U0,1A′B′
†
U1,0A′B′ |γ1,0m,n〉A′B′ 〈e
P
m′,n′ |ePm,n〉E
)
= e−(U
0,1 †
A′B′U
1,0
A′B′)
(S16)
The only free parameters over which we can optimize are the twisting unitaries, {U0,1A′B′ , U1,0A′B′ , U0,0A′B′ , U1,1A′B′}, where
each of the four unitaries can be defined independently of the others. Here, we have found that the two objective
functions in the key rate e±(U), are functions of independent variables: e+(U) only depends on U+ = U
0,0 †
A′B′U
1,1
A′B′
and e−(U) only depends on U− = U
0,1 †
A′B′U
1,0
A′B′ . This is very good, since it means the difficult task of nonlinear
optimization of the six state key rate formula can be avoided. Using the monotonicity of the binary entropy, we can
directly optimize e±(U±) within the binary entropy functions:
R = max
U
p0,0det
(
1− h2(eZ)− eZh2
[
1 + e−(U)/eZ
2
]
− (1− eZ)h2
[
1− [e+(U) + eZ ]/2
1− eZ
])
= p0,0det
(
1− h2(eZ)− eZh2
[
1 + maxU− e−(U−)/eZ
2
]
− (1− eZ)h2
[
1− [minU+ e+(U+) + eZ ]/2
1− eZ
]) (S17)
with the extra conditions 0 ≤ e−(U−) ≤ eZ and eZ ≤ e+(U+) ≤ 1 so that the arguments of the binary entropy
functions remain between 0 and 1.
2. Two independent semidefinite programs
We recall that 〈ePm′,n′ |ePm,n〉E are known from Eq. S2, while 〈γ
x′,y′
m′,n′ |Ux
′,y′
A′B′
†
Ux,yA′B′ |γx,ym,n〉A′B′ are the optimization
variables. This leads to two independent semidefinite programs.
• For the linear objective function e−(U−), we note the optimization variables
〈γx,(x+1 mod 2)m′,n′ |Ux,(x+1 mod 2)A′B′
†
U
y,(y+1 mod 2)
A′B′ |γy,(y+1 mod 2)m,n 〉A′B′ (S18)
form the 8× 8 positive semidefinite Gram matrix for the vectors {U0,1A′B′ |γ0,1m,n〉A′B′ , U
1,0
A′B′ |γ1,0m,n〉A′B′}, subject
to the eight linear constraints from Eq. S9:
〈γx,(x+1 mod 2)m′,n′ |Ux,(x+1 mod 2)A′B′
†
U
x,(x+1 mod 2)
A′B′ |γx(x+1 mod 2)m,n 〉A′B′ = 〈γ
x,(x+1 mod 2)
m′,n′ |γx,(x+1 mod 2)m,n 〉A′B′ (S19)
The optimization is additionally constrained by 0 ≤ e−(U−) ≤ eZ .
• For the linear objective function e+(U+), we note the optimization variables
〈γx,xm′,n′ |Ux,xA′B′†Uy,yA′B′ |γy,ym,n〉A′B′ (S20)
form the 8×8 PSD Gram matrix for the vectors {U0,0A′B′ |γ0,0m,n〉A′B′ , U
1,1
A′B′ |γ1,1m,n〉A′B′}, subject to the eight linear
constraints from Eq. S9:
〈γx,xm′,n′ |Ux,xA′B′†Ux,xA′B′ |γx,xm,n〉A′B′ = 〈γ
x,x
m′,n′ |γx,xm,n〉A′B′ (S21)
The optimization is additionally constrained by eZ ≤ e+(U+) ≤ 1.
With that, we have two independent semidefinite programs which can be used to optimize the six state key rate
formula. In section V, we provide a pseudocode overview of our numerical technique for calculating the key rate.
6IV. (δ, p)-MODEL FOR SIGNAL STATES
We consider the following two-parameter (δ, p)-model for the initial states which Alice and Bob prepare:
ρ0,0A = σ
0,0
B = (1− p) |ξδ00〉 〈ξδ00|+ p1
ρ0,1A = σ
1,0
B = (1− p) |ξδ01〉 〈ξδ01|+ p1
ρ1,0A = σ
0,1
B = (1− p) |ξδ10〉 〈ξδ10|+ p1
ρ1,1A = σ
1,1
B = (1− p) |ξδ11〉 〈ξδ11|+ p1
(S22)
where the states |ξδ〉 are of the form:
|ξδ00〉 = |H〉
|ξδ01〉 = − sin
δ
2
|H〉+ cos δ
2
|V 〉
|ξδ10〉 = cos
pi + δ
4
|H〉+ sin pi + δ
4
|V 〉
|ξδ11〉 = cos
−pi + δ
4
|H〉+ i sin −pi + δ
4
|V 〉
(S23)
The states |ξδ〉 parametrized by δ are a model for Alice and Bob attempting to prepare {|H〉 , |V 〉 , |H〉+|V 〉/√2, |H〉−i|V 〉/√2},
but each state is subject to a different, constant state-dependent modulation error. The pure |ξδ〉 states and the
resulting key rates were considered in the loss-tolerant protocol [3]. Additionally, were the modulation error a random
variable subject to a distribution on the Bloch sphere, we expect the average state to be mixed with a shorter than
unit Bloch vector. This effect is accounted for with the depolarizing channel parametrized by p, which indicates with
some probability the maximally mixed state is sent, shortening the Bloch vector. The depolarizing channel can also
be used to model any thermal photons that are accidentally produced during state preparation.
V. PSEUDOCODE FOR KEY RATE CALCULATION
Here we present a sketch of our numerical implementation for calculating key rates. For the semidefinite programs
we employed CVXPY [13, 14], a convex optimization library for Python. All codes are available upon request.
Algorithm 1 Key rate function
function keyrate(ρA, σB , pA, qB , pdark, η, l)
# ρA and σB are lists of Alice and Bob’s four density matrices
# pA and qB are lists of the probabilities for sending their four states
# pdark is the dark count probability per detector
# η is the overall transmissivity
# l is the Alice-Charlie distance (same for Bob)
#
# Probability of losing a photon
p0 = 1− η10−0.2l/20
# Extract protocol statistics
~pdet,γˆ= stats(ρA,σB ,pA,qB ,p0,pdark)
# Key generation detection probability
p0,0det =
∑3
i=0 ~pdet[i]
# Bit error rate
eZ = ~pdet[1] + ~pdet[2]
# Solving for Eve’s Gramian matrix (Eq. 3 of main text)
~e = γˆ−1~pdet
# Phase error rates
e− = emin(ρA, σB , ~e, eZ , p
0,0
det)
e+ = eplus(ρA, σB , ~e, eZ , p
0,0
det)
# Key rate
R = p0,0det
[
1− h2(eZ)− eZh2
(
1+e−/eZ
2
)
− (1− ez)h2
(
1−(e++eZ)/2
1−eZ
)]
return R
end function
7Algorithm 2 Protocol statistics function
function stats(ρA,σB ,pA,qB ,p0,pdark)
# Loop over all 16 combinations of states in lists: i,j=1,2,3,4
# Probability of passing if both photons arrive
ppass[4i+ j] = pA[i]qB [j]Tr(ρA[i]σB [j] |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|AB)
# Detection probability including dark counts and loss
pdet[4i+ j] = (1− p0)2(1− pdark)2ppass[4i+ j] + 2pA[i]qB [j][p20p2dark(1− pdark)2 + p0(1− p0)pdark(1− pdark)2]
# Filling the 16 rows of the γˆ matrix
γˆ[4i+ j, :] = pA[i]qB [j]vec(ρA[i]σB [j])
return ~pdet, γˆ
end function
Algorithm 3 Phase errors
function emin(ρA, σB , ~e, eZ , p
0,0
det)
# Reshape ~e into a matrix
eˆ = reshape(~e)
# We use the CVXPY and Mosek packages for solving semidefinite programs
import cvxpy
# Define the 8x8 Gramian matrix from Eq. S18 for the A′B′ systems as the optimization variables of the system
G = cvxpy.Variable((8,8))
# Define a list of constraints on G, such as PSD and constraint from Eq. S19
constraints = [G  0]
constraints += [G[4i+ 2m+ n, 4i+ 2m′ + n′] = ρA[i][m,m′]σB [(i+ 1) mod 2][n, n′]] #i = 0, 1;m,m′, n, n′ = 0, 1, 2, 3
# Define the objective function
e− = − 2
p
0,0
det
∑
m,m′,n,n′ Re(eˆ[2m+ n, 2m
′ + n′]G[2m+ n, 4 + 2m′ + n′])
constraints += [e− ≥ 0, e− ≤ eZ ]
# Use cvxpy to solve problem
prob = cvxpy.Problem(cvxpy.Maximize(e−),constraints)
prob.solve(solver = cvxpy.MOSEK)
e− = prob.value
return e−
end function
function eplus(ρA, σB , ~e, eZ , p
0,0
det)
# Reshape ~e into a matrix
eˆ = reshape(~e)
# We use the CVXPY and Mosek packages for solving semidefinite programs
import cvxpy
# Define the 8x8 Gramian matrix from Eq. S20 for the A′B′ systems as the Variable of the system
G = cvxpy.Variable((8,8))
# Define a list of constraints on G, such as PSD and constraint from Eq. S21
constraints = [G  0]
constraints += [G[4i+ 2m+ n, 4i+ 2m′ + n′] = ρA[i][m,m′]σB [i][n, n′]] #i = 0, 1;m,m′, n, n′ = 0, 1, 2, 3
# Define the objective function
e+ = 1− 2
p
0,0
det
∑
m,m′,n,n′ Re(eˆ[2m+ n, 2m
′ + n′]G[2m+ n, 4 + 2m′ + n′])
constraints += [e+ ≥ eZ , e+ ≤ 1]
# Use cvxpy to solve problem
prob = cvxpy.Problem(cvxpy.Minimize(e+),constraints)
prob.solve(solver = cvxpy.MOSEK)
e+ = prob.value
return e+
end function
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